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Immigration adjudication is in an awkward position in the United States. 1
Although there is an intricate system to adjudicate immigration removal
(deportation) cases, the system is hindered by restrictions on judicial review and
the threat of further limitations. The restrictions and the threats of further
limitations reflect distaste for providing access to the courts to foreign nationals
facing removal. 2 There is a push and pull phenomenon, with the immigration
adjudication system stretched uncomfortably between two forces. On one side,
there is a push to apply common notions of due process to immigration removal
+
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Law. Thank you to the Queen Mary School of Law, University of London, for hosting me as a
Visiting Scholar. This Article greatly benefitted from the insights of participants in a faculty
colloquium at Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, the participants at the biennial
Immigration Law Professors’ Conference at the University of California, Irvine School of Law,
and the input of participants in the Migration and Law Network Conference at Birkbeck College
School of Law, University of London. Elspeth Guild, Steve Legomsky, Hiroshi Motomura, and
Helena Wray provided invaluable comments on earlier versions of this Article. Brent Johnson
provided first-rate library assistance and Marissa Mowery provided excellent research assistance.
1. This Article focuses on removal adjudication and does not address applications for
immigration benefits.
2. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615–16 (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing] (“Immigration policy and judicial review have always had a kind of oil-and-water
relationship.”).
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cases, driven by the notion that the same concepts of procedural justice and
access to justice should apply in immigration cases as would in any other
context. On the other side, there is a pull away from these common conceptions
and a belief that less process and access to justice is not only acceptable, but
preferable, when it comes to foreign nationals facing removal from the United
States.
One oft-stated justification for cutting back access to justice in the
immigration removal context is that providing access to courts allows foreign
nationals means to delay their removal. 3 Some argue that by pursuing legal
challenges in court, foreign nationals gain more time in the United States and
delay, or perhaps ultimately prevent, removal from the United States. 4 The delay
rationale places the blame on individual foreign nationals and their attorneys for
accessing justice. The rationale assumes and promotes the idea that foreign
nationals seek judicial review for less than honorable reasons, and therefore,
curtailing access to the courts is justified. 5
This Article concludes that the delay rationale is “window dressing” for a
deeper disagreement about the role of national sovereignty in immigration law. 6
The delay rationale rests upon, and is an expression of hope for the continued
existence of, a conception of immigration sovereignty that places the will of the
national government above all else. It relies on a classical conception of
immigration sovereignty rooted in the plenary power doctrine. 7 As announced
by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, the plenary power doctrine
gives Congress and the President unfettered power over certain aspects of
immigration law. 8 This plenary power notion of immigration sovereignty
contrasts with a more modern notion of sovereignty, which expressly
incorporates concern for the individual and envisions a more limited role for
government when it comes to the treatment of individual foreign nationals. 9
3. See infra Part I.B (explaining the delay rationale in detail).
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23 (1961).
5. An empirical study questioned the major assumption underlying the delay rationale—that
judicial review takes a long time. Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf & Rebecca Gill, Buying Time?
False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679, 681 (2014). After analyzing
over 1,600 immigration petitions from eleven federal circuit courts, the authors found the “results
suggest that concerns about delay are overblown . . . .” Id. at 682. According to the study, the
delay theory relies heavily on the assumption “that the federal court process takes a long time.” Id.
at 694. Instead, the study concludes that “an appeal to a federal court may be the fastest part of the
immigration adjudication system, and that federal courts often resolve weak cases quickly.” Id.
6. Delay is a legitimate concern in structuring an adjudication system. See, e.g., Stephen H.
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration
Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1330–32 (1986) [Legomsky, Forum Choices]. This Article
reveals, however, that something other than delay is motivating efforts to restrict court access in
the context of judicial review of removal cases.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.
9. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–4
(1984) [hereinafter Schuck, Transformation].
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While some aspects of the plenary power doctrine have softened and have
become nuanced, this Article connects the delay rationale to the view of
immigration sovereignty expressed in those foundational Supreme Court cases
that established the plenary power doctrine.
Other factors besides sovereignty, varying from individual to individual,
motivate objections to providing access to courts to foreign nationals facing
removal. Those factors include general antipathy towards courts, political
strategy, efficiency, costs, and, in some instances, xenophobia and racism. 10
This Article does not discount those forces. 11 This Article instead focuses on
the role of immigration sovereignty in motivating efforts to restrict access to
courts under the banner of unjustified delay. Viewing immigration adjudication
through the lens of sovereignty reveals a need to peel back the argument about
delay, and to acknowledge and resolve the debate over immigration sovereignty.
By examining a similar phenomenon in the United Kingdom (U.K.), this
Article demonstrates that the debate over the nature of immigration sovereignty
must be resolved in the popular imagination as well as through formal legal
means. The U.K.’s elaborate system for review of immigration removal cases
is subject to a multitude of restrictions and faces a nearly constant threat of
further restrictions. 12 Proponents of restrictions in the U.K. often cite concerns
about delay as the primary justification for those restrictions. 13 Thus, the U.K.
is engaged in a similar debate, despite the fact that it has incorporated into its
domestic law international obligations recognizing more modern notions of
sovereignty, with a heavy emphasis on respect of individual rights. 14 In the
U.K., defining the role of sovereignty in the context of immigration remains a
fierce battle. 15 The U.K. experience does not provide a solution for the U.S.
debate, but it does serve as a lesson that change in public perception is a
necessary companion to formal legal change.
Until the debate over immigration sovereignty is resolved, immigration
adjudication in the United States will continue its uncomfortable existence. This
Article shifts the focus away from the distracting delay debate and instead
focuses on fundamentally different perspectives of immigration sovereignty. 16
10. See Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 2, at 1627–30. Additionally, Professor
Hiroshi Motomura has described a misconception that substantive immigration law is simple, and
that the misconception contributes to an idea that maintaining the “rule of law” in the immigration
law realm is uncomplicated and therefore court review is superfluous. HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 189-92 (2014) [hereinafter MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION
OUTSIDE].
11. In fact, these forces could influence one’s preferred approach to immigration sovereignty.
12. See infra Part II.C.1.
13. See, e.g., infra notes 205–206.
14. See infra Part II.C.1.
15. See infra Part II.C.1.
16. The awkwardness of immigration adjudication in the United States is connected to a
broader, ongoing struggle to balance individual rights with government control in all aspects of
immigration law. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that
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Then, this Article contends that even if the United States achieves formal legal
change, the U.K.’s experience demonstrates that a change in public perception
of what sovereignty means in the context of immigration is required.
I. THE DELAY RATIONALE AND EFFORTS TO RESTRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL CASES
A. The Role of Judicial Review in Immigration Removal Cases
Most adjudication of removal (deportation) cases in the United States occurs
within an executive branch agency, but there is the possibility of independent
judicial review in the federal courts. 17 Federal court review of removal decisions
is subject to timing, form, and substantive restrictions. 18
In most immigration removal cases, the process begins with the filing of a
charging document called a Notice to Appear (NTA), which directs the foreign
national to appear in Immigration Court. 19 The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) issues the charging document, listing the reasons why the
government believes the foreign national is removable. 20 Additionally, DHS
will assign one of its lawyers to represent the government in the immigration
proceeding. 21 As the first step in the proceeding, an Immigration Court acts as
the trial-level for removal adjudication. 22 An immigration judge holds a hearing
and ultimately decides whether to order the foreign national’s removal. 23
Immigration judges are not members of the judicial branch; instead, immigration
judges are attorneys employed by the Department of Justice (DOJ). 24 Scholars,
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994) (comparing the Supreme Court’s
characterization of alienage as a “legal status [that] . . . is a presumptively illegitimate basis for
discriminatory treatment” with the idea that national sovereignty authorizes a nation to secure its
borders from “outsiders”).
17. See Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 502 (2008) [hereinafter Family, Stripping Judicial Review]
(discussing the U.S. immigration adjudication process).
18. See id. at 502–03.
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2014).
20. Id. at § 1003.15.
21. See Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), ICE, http://www.ice.gov/
about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (describing the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor as DHS’ largest legal program and the
“exclusive legal representative for the U.S. government” in removal proceedings before the
Executive Office for Immigration Review).
22. Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 600 (2008) [hereinafter Family, A Broader View].
23. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).
24. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673-(Sept. 20, 2007) (explaining that
immigration judges are “Department of Justice attorneys who are designated by the-Attorney
General to conduct such proceedings, and they are-subject to the Attorney General’s direction and
control.”).
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including the author, have debated whether these judges have sufficient
decisional independence from their employer, the DOJ. 25 A DOJ employee
presides over the hearing, while an employee of DHS, another executive branch
agency, represents the government during that hearing. Nearly half of the
individuals in Immigration Court, however, appear unrepresented. 26 The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) does not provide for
government-funded counsel in Immigration Court. 27
After the immigration judge issues her order, both the foreign national and the
government have an opportunity to appeal the decision to the second level of
agency adjudication, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 28 As part of
DOJ, the BIA hears appeals from immigration judge decisions. 29 Members of
the BIA are also not a part of the judicial branch, nor do they receive the statutory
protections afforded to administrative law judges. 30 Instead, the BIA members
are attorneys employed by DOJ. 31 Appeals to the BIA are almost always
decided solely on paper submissions. 32 The BIA reviews an immigration
judge’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. 33 The Board has de
novo review authority over questions of law, challenges to the application of law
to facts, and questions of discretion in appeals from immigration judge
decisions. 34
25. See, e.g., Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 600.
26. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FY
2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig. 9 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (finding that in Fiscal Year 2012, fifty-six percent of respondents
appearing in immigration court were represented, which was in increase over Fiscal Year 2009, in
which only forty-five percent were represented).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). In April 2013, DOJ and DHS announced a policy to provide
greater procedural protections for unrepresented respondents with serious mental disorders who
appear in immigration court. Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Dep’t of Justice
& the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees
with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/press/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html. Further, in April 2013, a
federal district court judge held that immigration detainees with mental disorders have a right to
government-funded counsel. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG, 2013 WL
3674492, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
28. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(c), 1003.3(a)(1).
29. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1); see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012) (providing administrative
law judges procedural protections in adverse employment actions through the Merit Systems
Protection Board).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1).
32. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.2(a) (2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/BIAPracticeManual.pdf#page=103 (“Oral argument
is held at the discretion of the Board and is rarely granted.”).
33. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
34. Id. at § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). See also In re A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 496 (BIA 2008)
(explaining that the BIA retains independent review authority over “pure questions of law and the
application of a particular standard of law to [the] facts” of the case).
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The BIA’s decision represents the final agency action. 35 If the final agency
action is an order to remove the foreign national, the foreign national may seek
judicial review of the agency’s order. 36 At this point, the process shifts from
adjudication within the executive branch to a hearing in an independent,
constitutionally authorized Article III court. 37 It is not until this moment of
judicial review that a non-agency employee would have authority over the
decision to remove. In seeking judicial review, the foreign national could
challenge mistakes of fact, law, or abuses of discretion, and could raise
constitutional challenges, including any alleged violations of the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
A foreign national seeking judicial review in an Article III court will discover,
however, that Congress has curtailed the availability of judicial review in
immigration removal cases. 38 The statutory authorization for judicial review
over removal cases begins by authorizing judicial review directly in a federal
court of appeals, but also chips away at that grant by listing “[m]atters not subject
to judicial review[.]” 39 Congress insulated many discretionary decisions from
review, including whether to grant relief from removal. 40 However, judicial
review remains over discretionary decisions related to the denial of an
application for asylum. 41 Removal decisions based on convictions for a variety
of crimes are also not subject to judicial review, unless the individual
challenging removal raises constitutional claims or questions of law. 42
Additionally, there are timing and form of action restrictions. 43
B. Efforts to Limit Immigration Judicial Review and the Delay Justification
From the advantage of hindsight, the United States has been on a trajectory of
narrowing and channeling the availability of judicial review over removal cases
35. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2012).
37. See id. at § 1252(a).
38. See, e.g., id. at § 1252(a)(2) (limiting matters subject to judicial review). See also Family,
A Broader View, supra note 22, at 608–09. The availability of judicial review over removal cases
implicates several thorny constitutional issues, such as the immigration plenary power doctrine
(discussed in Part II), congressional control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts generally, and
the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction. See generally Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future:
Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411
(1997) [hereinafter Benson, Back to the Future].
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
40. See id. at § 1252(a)(2)(B).
41. Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(C). See also Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010) (holding that
§ 1252(a)(2) does not bar judicial review of determinations made discretionary by regulation).
42. Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).
43. See, e.g., id. at § 1252(b)(1) (establishing that a petition for review must be filed within
thirty days after the final administrative decision to remove); id. at § 1252(b)(9) (consolidating all
questions of law and fact for review into the statutory review scheme and prohibiting habeas corpus
petitions unless otherwise provided by statute); id. at § 1252(f)(1)(B) (limiting the use of class
actions).
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since at least 1961. 44 In 1961, Congress eliminated the role of the federal district
courts in reviewing removal orders. Congress directed all those seeking judicial
review to file a petition for review directly with a U.S. Court of Appeals. 45
Before 1961, immigration statutes did not specifically address judicial review of
removal orders. 46 Filing a habeas corpus petition in a federal district court was
the main method of obtaining judicial review. 47 A federal court of appeals could
review a district court’s rejection of a habeas petition. 48 However, in 1961,
Congress added a statutorily mandated procedure for obtaining review that
eliminated the role of the federal district courts, as well as instituted a six-month
time limit on when challenges could be brought and a requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies. 49 Congress enacted the 1961 legislation after the
Supreme Court recognized review of immigration cases under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 50 The 1961 statute was intended to limit
the possibilities for review opened up by the Supreme Court’s recognition of
review under the APA. 51
Legislative reports explained that concerns about delay motivated the 1961
narrowing of judicial review. 52 One report stated:
The Committee on the Judiciary has been disturbed in recent years to
observe the growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by
undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but which
are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying
indefinitely their deportation from this country. . . . The alien whose
sole immigration offense is, perhaps, a defect in his visa, or an
overextended stay as a visitor, usually accepts the order of deportation
and departs. Other aliens, mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral, or
narcotic peddlers, manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only
44. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 752 (5th ed. 2003); see also Hirsohi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 461–66 (2006)
[hereinafter Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus].
45. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651.
46. See Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 256 (1998).
47. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 38, at 1431.
48. Id.
49. § 5(a), 75 Stat. at 651; H.R. REP. NO. 87-565, at 1 (1961) (“The purpose of [section 5] is
to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the
deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States, by adding a new section 106 to the
Immigration and Nationality Act.”).
50. See Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at 462–63 (discussing Congress’
reaction to Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) and Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180
(1956)).
51. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 752.
52. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-565, at 6-7; H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23 (1961). See also
Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of Carlos Marcello, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 134, 136–37 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
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because their ill-gotten gains permit them to procure the services of
astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit the judicial
process. Without any reflection upon the courts, it is undoubtedly now
the fact that such tactics can prevent enforcement of the deportation
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by repetitive
appeals to the busy and overworked courts with frivolous claims of
impropriety in the deportation proceedings. 53
President Dwight D. Eisenhower also expressed the delay rationale when he
stated to Congress, “I have previously called the attention of the Congress to the
necessity for a strengthening of our laws in respect to the aliens who resort to
repeated judicial reviews and appeals for the sole purpose of delaying their
justified expulsion from this country.” 54
Congress further enacted major restrictions on judicial review in 1996. 55
These restrictions maintained the 1961 statutory framework requiring filing of
petitions for review in the courts of appeals, but severely narrowed the ability of
the courts of appeals to review removal decisions. 56 Congress enacted
restrictions affecting the timing and form of challenges, as well as restrictions
on judicial review based on the substance of the case. 57 As described above, the
substantive restrictions include provisions that eliminate review over many
executive discretionary decisions in removal cases and that limit review of
removal orders based on the commission of various criminal acts. 58
Congress accepted the 1996 restrictions with little debate prior to enactment. 59
While legislative history is scarce, there is evidence that proponents of the 1996
restrictions advanced the delay rationale. 60 For example, the New York Times
reported that “[l]awmakers who supported the bill said it was necessary to
unclog an immigration system swamped with lawsuits by people without
53. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23.
54. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. In 1988, Congress shortened the time limit for filing a petition for review from six months
to sixty days for those whose removal orders were based on an aggravated felony conviction.
National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7347(b)(1), 102 Stat. 4181,
4472 (1988). In 1990, Congress shortened the time limit to thirty days. Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 100-649, § 502(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048. Before 1996, Congress enacted other
restrictions aimed at individuals with aggravated felony convictions, but 1996 marked a major
restructuring of immigration judicial review. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2026. This section
discusses changes implemented by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which superseded earlier changes brought by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. See Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at
463–64 (discussing the sequence of IIRIRA superseding AEDPA).
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
59. David Johnston, Government is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A20.
60. See id.
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citizenship or residency rights who used the Federal courts to prolong their stays
in the United States or even gain a foothold on American citizenship.” 61
Following the bill’s passage, Dan Stein (executive director of the Federation for
American Immigration Reform), expressed support for the restrictions,
specifically a limit on class actions, asserting that allowing class actions would
have allowed “illegal aliens, aliens without right to be here[,] the right to stay
Additionally, then-Senate Immigration
here for years on end . . . .” 62
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer Abraham explained that the restrictions were
aimed to address abuses of the system committed by “criminal immigrants.”63
He wrote, “Criminal immigrants demonstrated time and again an ability to delay
deportations through administrative appeals, judicial review and habeas corpus
petitions.” 64 He expressed a need “to crack down on those who come to the
United States and abuse our legal system . . . .” 65
Through the Real ID Act of 2005, Congress again narrowed judicial review. 66
The House Conference Report accompanying the Act highlighted delay as a
motivating factor. 67 With the REAL ID Act, Congress counteracted the
Supreme Court decision INS v. St. Cyr, 68 in which the Court held that Congress
had not spoken clearly enough to eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction. 69 In the
REAL ID Act, Congress expressly stated its intent to repeal habeas corpus
jurisdiction and to establish the petition for review procedure as the sole
mechanism for reviewing a removal order. 70
The delay rationale appears in the legislative history. The conference report
accompanying the Act stated, “Among the many problems caused by St. Cyr,
the most significant is that this decision allows criminal aliens to delay their
expulsion from the United States for years.” 71 Additionally, the report asserted
that “criminal aliens will have fewer opportunities to delay their removal” after
the enactment of the legislation. 72
61. Id.
62. Interview by Richard Gonzalez with Dan Stein, Exec. Dir., Fed of Am. Immigration
Reform, in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 26, 1996).
63. Spencer Abraham, Letter to the Editor, Law Addressed Abuses of Criminal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A14.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)) (eliminating other forms of jurisdiction for review of removal orders).
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 171 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
68. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
69. C.f. Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at 486–87 (explaining that the
enactment of the REAL ID Act was Congress’ direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in
St. Cyr).
70. Id. at 487.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173.
72. Id. at 174.
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Within the last ten years, Congress has debated major immigration reform
bills, but none have passed both houses. 73 Examining proposed immigration
reform bills reveals further instances of proponents asserting the delay
justification to support a decrease in the availability of judicial review. 74 First,
there was a failed attempt to further limit judicial review of removal cases during
a 2005– 2006 effort to overhaul U.S. immigration law. 75 Second, in 2013, there
was another futile attempt to restrict review over legalization decisions as a part
of immigration reform efforts. 76
With respect to the first example, during 2005– 2006, proponents of narrowed
judicial review proposed adding a certificate of reviewability requirement. 77
The requirement would have added a substantial hurdle to filing a petition for
review of a removal order. 78 Under this proposal, a filed petition for review
would be stalled until a court of appeals judge issued a certificate of
reviewability. 79 The judge could issue a certificate if the foreign national
seeking review made a “substantial showing that the petition for review is likely
to be granted.” 80 A judge’s decision to refuse to issue a certificate would be
unreviewable by the rest of the members of the court of appeals. 81 If a judge
failed to act on the request for a certificate, the legislation envisioned that the
petition for review would be denied. 82 The proposal to add the certificate of
reviewability requirement took place against a backdrop of a dramatic increase
in the number of removal petitions for review filed in U.S. Courts of Appeals. 83
The certificate of reviewability requirement appeared as part of a U.S. House
of Representatives bill called “Immigration Litigation Abuse Reduction.” 84 The
legislative history reveals that concerns about delay and frivolous filings
motivated proponents to push for the certificate of reviewability requirement.85
The House Republican majority’s report on the bill concluded that the “vast
majority” of petitions for review filed were ultimately denied. 86 Therefore, the
73. Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 506–07.
74. See id. at 513, 521.
75. See id. at 500 (discussing introduction of the certificate of reviewability as an attempt to
limit frivolous suits).
76. Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9-10 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
77. See Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 506–28.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 509.
80. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 805(b)(D)(iii) (2005). See also Family, Stripping Judicial
Review, supra note 17, at 509.
81. Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 509.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 506.
84. H.R. 4437, at § 805(b).
85. H.R. REP. NO. 109-345, at 77–78 (2005).
86. Id. at 77.
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report concludes that the increase in the number of filed petitions for review
must be due to an increase in the filing of meritless appeals. 87
When the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered the certificate
of reviewability gatekeeping requirement, two supporters of the measure
mentioned frivolous filings and delay objections as justifications for the
procedure. One federal court of appeals judge testified: “Even if the appeal lacks
all merit, the backlog of cases in the circuit courts provides an incentive to appeal
by almost guaranteeing a significant delay in deportation.” 88 Similarly, a DOJ
representative argued that the certificate of reviewability would remove the
incentive to file a petition for review as a means to delay removal. 89
With respect to the second example, the delay justification surfaced as part of
the 2013 debate over immigration reform. While not directly addressing judicial
review of removal cases, proponents of providing limited judicial review over
agency decisions to legalize the immigration status of foreign nationals raised
the delay rationale as a justification for providing less process. 90 During the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s discussions, Senator Charles Grassley
proposed an amendment that would have severely limited access to the federal
courts to review an agency legalization decision. 91 The Committee rejected the
amendment. 92 In explaining his desire to cabin judicial review, Senator Grassley
stated, “you can have people forever delaying deportation because of the ability
to appeal[,]” and he expressed a concern that an “immigrant who has filed a . . .
meritless application under the [legalization] program[,] could hold up his
removal for many years . . . .” 93
II. DELAY AND A DISPUTE OVER IMMIGRATION SOVEREIGNTY
As previously described, proponents of narrowed judicial review consistently
float one justification that blames foreign nationals and their attorneys for the
need for decreased access. This argument for decreased access characterizes
foreign nationals as acting under improper motivations. According to this
narrative, foreign nationals file frivolous lawsuits to delay removal. Therefore,
the need to narrow court access is the fault of foreign nationals who allegedly
seek to abuse the system.
87. See id. at 77–78.
88. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing on S. 2611 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 50 (2006) (statement of J. Carlos T. Bea, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit).
89. See id. at 27 (statement of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
90. See Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9–11 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 14–15 (demonstrating that twelve out of eighteen committee members rejected
Senator Grassley’s amendment to limit access to federal courts).
93. Id. at 9, 10 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
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However, the argument about delay is not simply about delay. Digging
deeper, this Article exposes that the chances for delay are scarce and that
proponents of the delay rationale actually are expressing a preference for the
strongest form of plenary power. The delay rationale is an unsupported and
convenient diversion from the underlying conflict about how to balance
individual rights with government control in immigration law. Further debate
in the context of that underlying conflict, rather than placing the blame on
foreign nationals seeking access to courts, is needed.
A. Delay or Something Else?
Six observations lend support to the conclusion that the delay rationale is not
solely about delay. First, anecdotal evidence usually is the only support for the
assertion that there is prevalent abuse of court access. The empirical and
administrative design questions of whether, and to what extent, foreign nationals
seek judicial review as a tactic to delay deportation and what constitutes an
acceptable amount of delay in any adjudication are beyond the scope of this
Article. The failure of supporters of decreased judicial review to justify
empirically the claim of delay, however, signals a need to examine the
justification more deeply. In fact, one study has determined claims of delay
through federal court action are overstated, and federal courts usually resolve
these cases in a matter of months. 94 The study further notes that most noncitizens do not pursue judicial review at all. 95 Instead of delay during the federal
court stage, the study points to greater delay at the administrative level,
particularly with respect to waits for a hearing before an immigration judge. 96
These delays are the result of increased enforcement efforts and a lack of
concomitant resources devoted to immigration courts. 97 Failure to account for
this information leads to overemphasis on anecdotal evidence.
Second, mandatory detention provisions dictate the detention of many foreign
nationals during their removal proceedings, including during judicial review. 98
To a detained foreign national, seeking judicial review would mean additional
time in custody, not additional time to live freely in the United States.
Third, as Professor Stephen H. Legomsky has recognized, Congress has
already prevented judicial review from delaying removal by not providing an

94. See Kagan, Marouf & Gill, supra note 5, at 696–97.
95. Id. at 689–90.
96. Id. at 721–22 (noting immigration judicial review in the federal courts of appeals usually
takes less than a year, while the average duration of a case in the administrative immigration court
is 550 days).
97. Ellen Frankman, Immigration Judge: Courts Overwhelmed & Under-Resourced, TAKE
AWAY (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/immigration-judge-says-courts-needreform/. See also Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of
November 2014, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_
backlog_avgdays.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
98. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012).
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automatic stay of removal pending judicial review. 99 The reviewing federal
court must now affirmatively grant a stay, which means the foreign national
could be removed from the United States while a petition for judicial review is
pending if no stay is granted. 100 Consequently, judicial review alone does not
guarantee a delay in removal.
Fourth, Professor Lenni B. Benson has explained how previous restrictions on
judicial review in the United States have led to protracted litigation over the
meaning of those restrictions and their validity, including increased litigation
over constitutional claims. 101 From an efficiency perspective, simply allowing
the courts to review a removal decision would be more efficient than risking the
possibility of extra litigation over whether the court may hear the claim.
Furthermore, this suggests that changing the judicial review process, rather than
blocking access, may increase efficiency. 102 Ultimately, the pursuit of cuts to
judicial review, which result in additional litigation, suggests efforts to narrow
court access are not based solely on efficiency concerns.
Fifth, other existing mechanisms divert foreign nationals from entering the
civil immigration adjudication system and promote quick removal with little
process. 103 Implementation of such “nonjudicial removals” has increased
exponentially, comprising seventy-five percent of all removals in 2012. 104 For
example, the expedited removal program diverts certain foreign nationals from
a hearing before an immigration judge and instead grants border patrol officers
the authority to remove the foreign national. 105 Congress did not provide for
robust judicial review of individual expedited removal orders. 106 Another
example is Operation Streamline, which allows for removal through criminal
prosecution of foreign nationals for certain immigration violations. 107 Foreign
nationals are sentenced en masse, with judges spending as little as twenty-five
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1649–50 (2010) [hereinafter Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication].
100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B); Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra
note 99, at 1649–50.
101. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 38, at 1483–85; Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper
Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration
Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006) [hereinafter Benson, Making
Paper Dolls].
102. See, e.g., Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 99, at 1720
(recommending a re-design of judicial review).
103. See Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 611, 624 (categorizing the mechanisms by
which to divert foreign nationals from immigration adjudication, such as government-imposed
waivers of access and expedited removals).
104. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA:
RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 24 (2014), available at http://www.migration
policy.org/research/deportation-dilemma-reconciling-tough-humane-enforcement.
105. Id. at 25–26.
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (2012).
107. Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 627–28.
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seconds per matter. 108 An individual diverted from the civil immigration
adjudication system into one of these channels has no opportunity to delay
removal by seeking access to court.
Sixth, the argument about delay is raised regardless of whether review has
already been narrowed. Proponents of restricted access to courts have no clear
concept of what level of judicial review is ideal. The logical extension of
constant, unfocused narrowing of judicial review is the continual elimination of
access to courts, perhaps to the point of no access. This suggests that those
claiming delay contemplate a deeper question of whether the foreign national
should have court access at all.
Close examination of claims of delay and abuse of court access reveal a lack
of depth in the argument. Further claims of delay reflect something else. They
reflect a desire to hang on to a classical plenary power notion of the
government’s role in immigration law.
B. The Dispute over Immigration Sovereignty
Immigration law invokes substantial questions about the nature and strength
of government power. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has linked immigration
law to national sovereignty, the rights of individual foreign nationals often
conflict with the strong force of sovereign will. The proper balance between
individual rights and national will is unresolved, with some preferring to adhere
to a classical version of plenary power while others promote a more progressive
approach that allows room for individual rights. There is a link between
immigration law and sovereignty, and the delay rationale is “window dressing”
for a debate over the ideal balance between these competing interests.
1. What is Immigration Sovereignty?
Immigration law implicates sovereignty. 109 In the late nineteenth century
Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 110 the U.S. Supreme
Court linked immigration law with notions of national sovereignty. The
Supreme Court held that the federal government’s power to regulate
immigration was founded in the fundamental sovereignty of the country. 111 The
Court stated:

108. See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at A12.
109. Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 489, 559 (“The link between immigration and national sovereignty has a long history in
the United States.”).
110. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
111. See id. at 609. See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1, 129–31 (2002). For a more thorough discussion of other theories justifying the use
of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and

2014]

Removing the Distraction of Delay

113

The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained
on behalf of any one. 112
Because the decision whether to admit a foreign national into the country was
characterized as a decision that cuts at the heart of the identity, size, and shape
of the nation, the Supreme Court described a plenary power available to the
political branches in the realm of immigration law. 113
This decision established an unusual trajectory for immigration law in the
United States. While constitutional principles evolved in other contexts, the
Supreme Court continued to hold that those advancements did not apply to
immigration law. 114 For example, Congress has almost unfettered discretion to
set the conditions of admission into the United States 115 and to establish reasons
for deporting a foreign national. 116 Additionally, procedural due process
protections do not extend to those applying for initial entry or to those with long
absences from the United States. 117 The status quo is rooted in the plenary power
doctrine, which in turn is at least partially rooted in a notion of sovereignty
dating back to the nineteenth century. As described by Professor Kevin Johnson,

the Principle of Plenary Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 261, 269–71, 275–77 (1984) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power].
112. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
113. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 184–85 (1987) [hereinafter LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE
JUDICIARY] (“[The sovereignty theory] has served as a pedestal on which the plenary power
doctrine has been based.”); Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at
273–74 (describing and criticizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on sovereignty as a justification
for the plenary power doctrine).
114. Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925–26 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten More
Years] (citations omitted) (“For more than a hundred years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has been telling us that immigration law is just plain different.”).
115. In a 1977 decision, the Supreme Court discussed courts’ “limited judicial responsibility”
in reviewing Congress’ choices with respect to admission categories. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
793 n.5 (1977). The Court described congressional power as “largely immune from judicial
control.” Id. at 792. While this language may signal a movement away from absolute power, the
Fiallo Court held Congress to a very mild standard of scrutiny. The Court looked only for a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the congressional action. Id. at 794.
116. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952).
117. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1950); Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
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the plenary power doctrine is “[f]ounded on notions of the raw sovereignty of
the nation-state . . . .” 118
Admittedly, immigration law has evolved in some contexts, with courts
asserting a more involved role in reviewing certain types of immigration
decision-making, particularly in the areas of removal procedures and postremoval detention. For example, individuals within U.S. borders are entitled to
due process protections during removal proceedings. 119 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has developed a doctrine under which certain returning lawful
permanent residents do not lose due process protection upon physically exiting
the boundaries of the United States. 120
In some respects, immigration law is lurching towards mainstream
constitutional law, but in many respects, it is still stuck in its nineteenth century
roots. 121 Scholars have discussed this transformation, documenting plenary
power doctrine trends and predicting what the future may hold for that
concept. 122
For example, Professor Peter Schuck has argued that immigration law is
slowly progressing from its classical roots towards “communitarian” ideals. 123
Schuck described the development of classical immigration law in the late
nineteenth century as a rejection of the liberal values that epitomized the first
period of U.S. immigration. 124 During that first period, from the nation’s
founding to the 1880s, the country’s outlook on immigration was driven by a
focus on the individual. 125 According to Schuck, “[t]he liberalism of America’s
first century conceived of persons as autonomous, self-defining individuals

118. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 197–98 (2003) [hereinafter
Johnson, Open Borders?] (“Under a strict plenary power regime, the U.S. government may act as
if it is in a state of nature without legal constraints in a modern ‘survival of the fittest’ world.”).
119. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001).
120. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–98 (1953); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
32–33 (1982).
121. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45
CONN. L. REV. 743, 810 (2013) (discussing the history and continuing role of sovereignty as a
justification for extra-constitutional authority over immigration law).
122. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 303–05
(predicting the continuing expansion of judicial review); Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note
114, at 936–37 (predicting the weakening, but not complete abolition of judicial deference to
Congress in immigration cases); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 610–11
(1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms] (predicting the courts will avoid
directly addressing constitutional issues and will continue to apply “phantom constitutional norms
much more favorable to aliens”); Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 73–75 (expressing
uncertainty of the future of immigration law but identifying three characteristics of the development
of that body of law).
123. See Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4.
124. Id. at 2–3.
125. Id. at 2.
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possessing equal moral worth and dignity and equally entitled to society’s
consideration and respect.” 126 The individual enjoyed “maximum liberty,” and
this outlook “was reflected in a policy of essentially open borders[.]” 127
The outlook shifted in the late nineteenth century as “[l]iberal values were
challenged by an array of exclusionary impulses[,]” including racial prejudice
and xenophobia. 128 As Schuck describes, this shift resulted in a sea of change
in immigration policy, with the focus shifting from individual liberty to national
sovereignty concerns. 129 Under this new order, the nation holds all of the cards
and the power to issue its consent to enter as it sees fit. 130
Classical immigration law envisions a small role for courts in reviewing the
immigration actions of the political branches. 131 Schuck observed a link
between “the powerful conception of national sovereignty” that is so tied to
classical immigration law and the reticence of federal judges to interject the
courts into review of immigration law. 132 Under a regime with federal
immigration law rooted in a concept of sovereignty (with the nation always
triumphing over the individual), there is little to no role for federal judges to
advance the interests of the individual.
This classical immigration law scheme, rooted in racial prejudice and bigotry,
is still a major influence in immigration law. 133 The new “communitarian”
approach (as described by Schuck) 134 is driven by a principle that “the
government owes legal duties to all individuals who manage to reach America’s
shores[.]” 135 Schuck observed that this new outlook was building momentum,
but that it had not yet displaced classical immigration law. 136
Other scholars have also persuasively presented diminishing aspects of the
plenary power doctrine. For example, Professors Stephen H. Legomsky and
Hiroshi Motomura have discussed that although certain court practices have
weakened the plenary power doctrine, it still exists. 137 Legomsky recognized
techniques of avoidance, including the Supreme Court’s occasional practice of
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3.
129. See id. at 3.
130. Id. at 47–48 (tying classical immigration law to the rights-privilege distinction once
prevalent in mainstream constitutional law).
131. Id. at 14–15.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); Cleveland, supra note 111, at
14 (describing the origins of the plenary power doctrine as rooted “in a peculiarly unattractive, latenineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American society and federal power”).
134. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
135. Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 296–99, 302–03;
Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 600.
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turning a blind eye to the doctrine. 138 Legomsky also recognized, and Motomura
further discussed, courts’ use of statutory interpretation techniques to soften the
blow of the plenary power doctrine. 139 This phenomenon allows a court to avoid
the harsh effects of the plenary power doctrine through the use of “phantom
constitutional norms,” created through heavy reliance on statutory interpretation
tools. 140 These “phantom norms” exist in immigration law, as opposed to an
actual, coherent constitutional structure. 141 The “articulated constitutional
norm—unreviewable plenary power[,]” is effectively weakened if courts decide
cases through statutory interpretation, in which constitutional concerns may be
considered. 142 Additionally, the willingness of courts to develop procedural due
process concepts in immigration law has weakened the plenary power
doctrine. 143
While the plenary power doctrine has not remained static, and its weaknesses
are well-documented, the Supreme Court has never formally disowned the
doctrine. At best, there has been a shift from it, but scholars still debate how far
courts have moved away from the doctrine. 144
The Supreme Court’s failure to confront the doctrine directly has allowed the
classical notion of immigration sovereignty to remain the default; weaknesses in
the doctrine are exceptions rather than the rule. This allows the classical notion
of immigration sovereignty to pervade immigration law discourse, including
policy debates about judicial review. Those promoting the delay rationale
actually are arguing for the classical form of plenary power; they are arguing
that the will of the sovereign trumps any individual interests.
2. Immigration Sovereignty and the Delay Rationale
The classical notion of immigration sovereignty is in conflict with judicial
review, which by its nature focuses on individual rights and tests the
government’s use of power. Under the classical notion of immigration
sovereignty, a nation is unrestrained to set its immigration policy, free to set the
conditions of entry, and free to revoke permission to be within the sovereign
borders on whatever substantive criteria it deems necessary. A more modern
notion of sovereignty places greater restraint on the power of the nation towards
individuals and integrates human rights considerations, such as the effects the

138. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 299.
139. Legomsky, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 156; Motomura,
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 549.
140. Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 564–65.
141. Id. at 549.
142. Id. at 564.
143. See Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 298–99; Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1627–28 (1992).
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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nation’s actions may have on the individual. 145 As Professor Elizabeth Bruch
has explained, the international law approach to sovereignty has evolved since
the late nineteenth century, now incorporating concerns about human rights. 146
Immigration law is stuck between the classical and more modern
approaches, 147 as evidenced by the debate over efforts to restrict foreign
nationals’ access to the courts to challenge removal decisions. Those who want
to limit access to the courts are motivated, at least in part, by a desire to maintain
the classical notion of immigration sovereignty epitomized by the plenary power
doctrine. The House Report supporting the 1961 restrictions on review stated:
“it is undoubtedly now the fact that such [delay] tactics can prevent enforcement
of the deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 148 This
language reveals an underlying position that effectuating deportations is of
paramount importance, while individual considerations are superfluous.
Other efforts to restrict judicial review have also dismissed the value of
individual rights, raising the need to get the particular individual out of the
country to enforce the national will. 149 Proponents of the 1996 restrictions
referred to “illegal aliens [who do not have] the right to be here . . . .” 150 This
suggests “a nation versus individual” outlook that downplays individual
concerns. Similarly, supporters of the REAL ID Act of 2005 emphasized the
bill’s ability to isolate “criminal aliens” and to prevent them from delaying
removal by narrowing their access to courts. 151
Professor Frank Wu has explained that under a more modern conception of
immigration sovereignty, the nation is defined not only by border lines and the
ability to dictate who may cross those lines under what circumstances, but also

145. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Open or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights, 96
KY. L.J. 197, 221 (2007–2008). See also Banks, supra note 109, at 527–28; Kitty Calavita, U.S.
Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 143, 147 (1994) (acknowledging a “contradiction between the concepts of inalienable human
rights and national sovereignty”).
146. Bruch, supra note 145, at 221 (“While still far from displacing the dominance of
sovereignty, the principles of self-determination, freedom of movement and nondiscrimination
have started to constrain unfettered notions of sovereignty as a matter of international human rights
law.”).
147. See Johnson, Open Borders?, supra note 118, at 207–08 (describing the difficulty of
incorporating notions of individual rights into a an immigration system so focused on national
sovereignty); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1398–1402
(2006) (describing the competing perspectives of immigration monism, in which “the protection of
national sovereignty [is] the primary goal of immigration law[,]” and immigration pluralism, which
recognizes that immigration law must serve other goals as well).
148. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part I.B.
150. Interview by Richard Gonzalez with Dan Stein, supra note 62.
151. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 174 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
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by how the nation treats those under its power. 152 While not completely
dismissing national sovereignty, Wu argued that “[n]ational sovereignty, by
itself, does not establish that the nation can regulate its borders by standards that
a consensus would hold absurd applied everywhere else.” 153
Similarly, judicial review, which by its nature focuses on an individual and
considers how the nation treats an individual foreign national, must seem foreign
to someone who adheres to the purest form of plenary power, in which national
power is unfettered. As Schuck described, when a more “communitarian”
notion of immigration law takes hold and the role of individual concerns
increases, there is a phenomenon where accessing courts necessarily delays
removal and allows for consideration of individual circumstances. 154
The notion that foreign nationals frivolously seek review to achieve delay
oversimplifies the true underlying debate. The dynamic is an evolving sense of
immigration sovereignty, with room to consider individual interests, as well as
the interests of the nation. The move away from an extreme vision of classical
immigration law would be upsetting to those who prefer the absolutist view. As
Professor Kevin R. Johnson has observed, “One’s views on plenary power
deeply affect how one views immigration.” 155 The debate is between an
approach that raises the prominence of concerns about individuals versus an
approach where the nation has “complete authority to define the rights of
noncitizens.” 156
During the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s 2013 debate on immigration
reform (previously mentioned above), Senators Charles Grassley, Richard
Durbin, and Charles Schumer illustrated competing ideals of judicial review.
Senator Grassley took a classical view of immigration sovereignty, arguing that
the nation has the absolute power to draw borderlines, and that the nation owes
no obligation to foreigners. 157 In response, Senators Durbin and Schumer
argued that other constitutional considerations have a role in the process,
including individual rights to access the courts. 158 Senator Grassley stated:
“[T]he bill treats [these legalization] program[s] as a legal right rather than

152. Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 39 (1995). See also Lindsay, supra note 121, at 811 (“Yet even if one
concedes that the principle of territorial sovereignty implies an authority to govern the right of noncitizens to enter into and remain within territory, it is unclear why the exercise of such authority
also requires that immigrants be denied important constitutional rights.”).
153. Id.
154. Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4, 66–67, 76.
155. Johnson, Open Borders?, supra note 118, at 212.
156. Id.
157. See Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
158. See, e.g., id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (commenting that Senator Grassley’s
proposal would disrupt the balance of power by limiting judicial review).
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discretionary benefit just like you have a civil right to come to this country. . . .
And where is it in the constitution?” 159 Senator Durbin countered:
[T]his amendment by Senator Grassley really gets at a basic element
in our government that we learned in the first civics class, and that is
checks and balances so that there is a balance of power in our
government. What the senator from Iowa wants to do is to reduce
judicial review of decisions made by the executive branch of
government. That’s an extraordinary position to take, particularly for
the Senator [sic] Judiciary Committee to take. We acknowledge that
the balance in our government between the three branches is what’s
kept it democratic and moving in the right direction. . . . What we say
in this bill is there ought to be somebody reviewing to make sure that
this decision is consistent with the underlying law. 160
Senator Leahy contributed: “It is amazing in the history that a country [sic] can
become as powerful, as diverse as [sic] wealthy as United States but [sic] remain
a democracy. And I think that’s because of our checks and balances.” 161 This
exchange demonstrates the push and pull between conceptions of immigration
sovereignty.
Because the delay rationale is consistently raised, no matter how much
judicial review has already narrowed, the end game for proponents of decreased
judicial review appears to be preventing court access. This goal correlates with
a classical notion of immigration sovereignty, where the power of the nation
over immigration law is absolute. Judicial review clearly frustrates this goal.
Viewed in this context, the debate concerning foreign national access to courts
in challenging removal decisions shifts from a caricature of a foreign national
filing a frivolous petition for review motivated solely by delay to a debate over
the nature of immigration sovereignty in the twenty-first century. 162 Peering
behind the delay rationale reveals this more fundamental debate. The question
runs deeper than “delay,” and addresses the balance of power between the
individual and the nation in immigration law.
C. Resolving the Dispute: A Lesson from the United Kingdom
The battle over immigration sovereignty must be acknowledged to discredit
the narrative that foreign nationals are doing something unseemly by seeking
access to judicial review. In addition to being acknowledged, the battle must
be resolved for there to be any hope of alleviating the constant push and pull in
immigration adjudication. Resolving the tension will require more than formal
legal adoption of a more modern approach to immigration sovereignty; it will
159. Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
160. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin).
161. Id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
162. There are undoubtedly other deeper divisions as well, such as a general distaste for the
courts (a more general separation of powers battle). See supra Part II.A.
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require a cultural shift in our understanding of what it means to be a sovereign
nation in the context of immigration law. The experience of the U.K. helps to
explain why more than formal legal recognition is necessary.
1. Efforts to Restrict Immigration Judicial Review in the United Kingdom
In the U.K., there is a similar push and pull in immigration adjudication. 163
There is a push to fulfill democratic principles and obligations to individuals,
accompanied by efforts to limit court access to foreign nationals. 164 The
existence of this phenomenon in the U.K. is interesting because the nation has
integrated a more modern version of sovereignty into its legal principles. 165 Yet,
there is still ambivalence, and even outright resistance, to providing process to
foreign nationals facing removal. 166 Thus, while a modern conception of
sovereignty has been integrated formally, the U.K. has yet to fully infiltrate the
public conception of immigration sovereignty.
The U.K. has acceded to international agreements that expressly elevate
concern for individual rights and reject the notion that sovereign will is
unlimited. For example, under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), there is an explicit right to family and private life. 167 While this right
is conditional, the ECHR demands that a foreign national’s situation be a
substantial consideration in an immigration decision. 168 In the context of
immigration, the ECHR asks if an immigration decision would interfere with an
individual’s right to family and private life to the extent that the interference is

163. As with the United States, immigration issues in the U.K. are complex and influenced by
various motivations. Comparisons across the two systems should not be overstated, as U.S. and
U.K. immigration policy rest on different systems of government and different social and political
histories. See supra Part I.
164. See, e.g., Alan Travis, Conservatives Promise to Scrap Human Rights Act After Next
Election, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/30/
conservitives-scrap-human-rights-act (noting that British Home Secretary Theresa May indicated
that avenues of appeal for those facing deportation would be narrowed).
165. See infra notes 167–170 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 164.
167. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Per the ECHR, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Id. Additionally, the ECHR mandates
[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of th[at] right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
168. Huang & Kashmiri v. Sec’y of State, [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C. 167. See also
Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration Tug of
War Between States and Their Supra-National Associations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 807, 837–38
(2011).
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disproportionate to the nation’s legitimate immigration goals. 169 This explicit
acknowledgement of individual interests rejects the classical plenary power
notion of sovereignty.
Through the Human Rights Act, the U.K. Parliament made the ECHR
enforceable in its courts. 170 Individuals need not rely solely on European courts
to adjudicate whether ECHR rights have been violated. Because the Human
Rights Act is primary legislation, the full force of parliamentary sovereignty
shields it. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament’s laws
are not subject to challenge in court; Parliament’s power is plenary. 171
Therefore, through the Human Rights Act, Parliament expressed an
unreviewable desire to allow individuals to enforce ECHR rights within the U.K.
The Human Rights Act creates an interesting dynamic for immigration law in
the U.K. Although primary legislation is not subject to court review, courts in
the U.K. may review the executive’s exercise of power under that legislation,
including both the formulation of rules under power delegated from Parliament,
as well as the executive’s application of those rules to an individual. 172 The
Prime Minister and the Cabinet functionally exercise the executive power in the
U.K. 173 Courts in the U.K. can and do review executive action in immigration
cases, and they may consider whether executive action is in compliance with the
Therefore, even if the executive’s decision on a particular
ECHR. 174
immigration application is justified under the U.K.’s immigration rules, a court
may consider whether the decision otherwise violates ECHR rights. 175 Also, the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has held that the power to control
immigration rests on statutory authority, and not on the vestiges of royal
(Executive) prerogative. 176
While Parliament itself generally wields plenary power, Parliament has
advanced beyond the U.S. in terms of formal legal recognition of a more modern

169. Huang & Kashmiri, [2007] UKHL 11. Huang & Kashmiri states:
the ultimate question for the appellate immigration authority is whether the refusal of
leave to enter or remain, in circumstances where the life of the family cannot reasonably
be expected to be enjoyed elsewhere, taking full account of all considerations weighing
in favour of the refusal, prejudices the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently
serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8.
Id.
170. Id.
171. See John McGarry, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Judges and the Asylum and Immigration
(Treatment of Claimants etc.) Bill, 26 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
172. Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 543, 550–54 (2013).
173. Id. at 550–51.
174. Huang & Kashmiri, [2007] UKHL 11.
175. See id.
176. R. v. Sec’y of State, [2012] UKSC 32.
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notion of sovereignty, which applies in the context of immigration law. 177
Through the enforcement of the ECHR, the baseline perspective in immigration
cases is that the will of the sovereign is not absolute. 178
Despite this formal incorporation of individual rights, the U.K. is experiencing
similar efforts to narrow court access for foreign nationals. As in the United
States, supporters of restricting court access for foreign nationals often cite delay
as a reason to curtail access. The existence of this similar phenomenon, despite
a default position that individual rights matter, suggests that formal legal
recognition of a more modern view of immigration sovereignty alone will not
resolve the uncomfortable position of immigration adjudication in the United
States.
To better understand the efforts to limit review of immigration removal
decisions in the U.K., background on the immigration adjudication system itself
is necessary. 179 The system to hear challenges of Home Office (Executive)
decisions to remove an individual involves both tribunals and courts, and the
differing roles of tribunals and courts are founded in an approach to court review
that distinguishes between an appeal and a judicial review. 180 In the United
States, an appeal on the merits and any judicial review for ultra vires activity
may occur simultaneously as a case works its way from an administrative, or
executive branch, adjudication into the constitutionally independent Article III
federal courts. For example, a federal court of appeals in the United States may
simultaneously (although subject to scope of review restrictions) review whether
lower-level agency adjudicators committed errors of fact or law in a particular
case and determine whether the government acted unlawfully or whether any
implicated congressional legislation is unconstitutional.
In contrast, the U.K. distinguishes between an appeal on the merits and a
judicial review. 181 In fact, they are wholly separate procedures. 182 During a
statutory appeal, the reviewing body considers the merits of the case, subject to
scope of review restrictions, looking for errors of law or fact as applied in the
particular case. 183 Generally, a judicial review is brought in the Administrative

177. Even if the effects of the Human Rights Act were not fully anticipated, the formal legal
conception of sovereignty changed. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
178. Some in the U.K. view this modified notion of sovereignty as an unacceptable
diminishment of that ideal. Immigration law is a factor in efforts to disentangle the U.K. from
European obligations. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 164 (detailing efforts in the U.K. to curb foreign
nationals’ court access by “scrap[ping] the Human Rights Act” and to withdraw from the ECHR).
179. For a broader comparative discussion of the courts’ role in both U.S. and U.K.
immigration law, see LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 253–57.
180. GINA CLAYTON, TEXTBOOK ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, 254, 271–72 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 4th ed. 2010).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 254.
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Court, a part of the High Court. 184 It is not a continuation of an appeal begun in
an administrative system. 185
During a judicial review, the reviewing court looks to whether the Executive
has acted unlawfully or whether any implicated Executive rule is unlawful (the
lawfulness of primary legislation is off limits). 186 The focus is not whether a
decision is wrong on the merits, but rather whether the public body exceeded its
jurisdiction by acting unlawfully. 187
There are a variety of restrictions on individuals seeking to challenge a
removal decision through a statutory appeal. 188 These restrictions often leave
seeking a judicial review as the only chance to challenge an immigration
decision. 189 Thus, while judicial review is always important as the mechanism
to challenge ultra vires activity, it has added significance in immigration cases.
The number of immigration judicial reviews has led the U.K. government to
attempt to restrict access to immigration judicial reviews. According to the
government, applicants use judicial review as a means of delay to gain more
time in the U.K. Three efforts to restrict judicial review of immigration cases in
the U.K. illustrate the use of the delay rationale: (1) a 2003–2004 effort to
184. See LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 12.
185. See id.
186. See HARRY WOOLF ET AL., DE SMITH’S JUDICIAL REVIEW 9 (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed.
2013). In the U.K., the concept of judicial review is a much newer phenomenon than in the United
States; U.K. scholars still debate whether that nation’s practice is constitutionally justified. See id.
187. Id. at 200. The U.K. Supreme Court previously explained:
[T]he scope of judicial review is an artefact of the common law whose object is to
maintain the rule of law—that is to ensure that, within the bounds of practical possibility,
decisions are taken in accordance with the law, and in particular the law which Parliament
has enacted, and not otherwise.
R v. Upper Tribunal, [2011] UKSC 28. The three primary bases for judicial review are procedural
propriety (were fair procedures used?), rationality (is the decision arbitrary?) and legality (was the
law applied correctly?). WOOLF ET AL., supra note 186, at 12. The distinction between a statutory
appeal and a judicial review has become blurred as the permitted considerations under judicial
review have expanded. Id. at 220. For example, a court, acting upon an application for judicial
review, may find that a public body acted unlawfully by applying the wrong legal principles (and
thus exceeded its jurisdiction). Id. But the historical foundation is that a judicial review is not the
proper forum in which to argue that a public body did everything correctly, but reached the wrong
conclusion. Id.
188. CLAYTON, supra note 180, at 271; see, e.g., Immigration Act 2014, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/section/15/enacted (last visited Dec. 22, 2014). See
also Immigration Bill Becomes Law, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
immigration-bill-becomes-law (last updated May 14, 2014) (noting that the bill reduced the number
of appeal grounds from seventeen to four). In support of the changes to the appeal system, the
Immigration Minister said, “The appeals system is like a never-ending game of snakes and ladders,
with almost 70,000 appeals heard every year. The winners are foreign criminals and immigration
lawyers-while the losers are the victims of these crimes and the public.” Home Office, Immigration
Bill, Factsheet: Overview of the Bill, GOV.UK 1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249251/Overview_Immigration_Bill_F
actsheet.pdf [hereinafter Home Office, Overview].
189. CLAYTON, supra note 180, at 271.
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eliminate entirely judicial review in immigration cases; (2) an ongoing effort to
move immigration judicial review cases from the general courts to the
immigration tribunals; and (3) a 2012–2013 effort to narrow immigration
judicial review. Also, the government has sought to cabin the discretion of
judges with respect to Article 8 of the ECHR. These actions further illustrate
the “anti-access to justice” mood prevalent in the U.K.
From 2003 to 2004, the U.K. government proposed to entirely oust, or
eliminate, judicial review in immigration cases. 190 Under the proposed ouster
clause, there would be no judicial review whatsoever. 191 The clause specifically
mentioned abolishing judicial review for lack of jurisdiction, irregularity, error
of law, and breach of natural justice. 192 The proposal caused quite a stir, with
the controversy spilling out of immigration law circles into broader legal circles
and the mainstream press. 193
Prominent members of the legal community spoke out against the ouster
clause. Lord Woolf, then-Lord Chief Justice (head of the judiciary), warned that
the ouster clause threatened the rule of law and could lead to calls for a written
constitution. 194 He said, “I am not over-dramatising [sic] the position if I
indicate that, if this clause were to become law, it would be so inconsistent with
the spirit of mutual respect between the different arms of government that it
could be the catalyst for a campaign for a written constitution.” 195 He asked,
“What areas of government decision-making would be next to be removed from
the scrutiny of the courts?” 196 A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of
Clashfern, said that the Government’s proposal “struck ‘right at the heart of the

190. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HOUSE OF LORDS, ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION
(TREATMENT OF CLAIMANTS, ETC.) BILL: FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2003-04 22–23 (2004).
191. Id.
192. See id. According to Lord Woolf, the-then Lord Chief Justice, he and other members of
the judiciary met with the government to discuss an earlier version of the ouster clause. Lord
Woolf, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Squire Centenary Lecture: The Rule of Law and a
Change in the Constitution (Mar. 3, 2004). The judiciary explained that the clause was in conflict
with the rule of law, and that it was futile to pursue because there were loopholes in the clause that
would allow the judiciary to exercise jurisdiction anyway. Id. Rather than heeding the judiciary’s
warnings that the clause violated the rule of law, the government redrafted the clause to try to close
the loopholes the judiciary identified. Id.
193. See, e.g., Joshua Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is Coming True MPs Have Agreed to
Abolish the Courts’ Entire Power of Judicial Review Over Decisions to be Taken by a New
Tribunal, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 4, 2004, at 19 [hereinafter Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is
Coming True] (“The House of Commons agreed this week to abolish the courts’ entire power of
judicial review over [immigration] decisions . . . . There will be no independent judicial oversight
over decisions to deport immigration applicants and remove asylum-seekers from Britain.”).
194. Joshua Rozenberg, Woolf Fury at Asylum Curb on the Courts Blunkett Bill ‘a Threat to
Rule of Law’, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 4, 2004, at 1.
195. Lord Woolf, supra note 192.
196. Id.
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rule of law.’” 197 If the clause were adopted, judges threatened to exercise a
“nuclear option” by refusing to enforce the clause. 198 This action would have
sparked a constitutional crisis, as the judges would be challenging directly the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 199 The Bar Council of England and
Wales described the ouster clause as “a startling proposition,” and found it
“incredible that it [was] proposed in the United Kingdom[.]” 200 Professor
Richard Rawlings described the effort as part of a “‘revenge package’” aimed
“to pre-empt or drastically reduce a whole activity of formal legal challenge and
by necessary implication to neuter the judicial role in the constitution.” 201
After the uproar, the government agreed to withdraw the ouster clause, but did
not abandon its perceived need to restrict immigration judicial review. 202 The
Constitution Secretary at the time of the proposal’s withdrawal said, “I believe
that we can have the necessary judicial oversight in the system by the higher
courts and obtain the aims of speed and reduction of abuse.” 203
The Constitution Secretary’s statement reveals that one justification for the
ouster clause was concern about delay. 204 The Home Secretary placed the need
for the ouster clause at the feet of lawyers, whom he characterized as “dragging
out cases for months and, in some instances, years.” 205 He further described the
system as “abused.” 206
Rawlings characterized the abuse and delay
justifications as a “familiar refrain” in British politics. 207 Government officials
described how “people [were] playing the system” and referred to “unnecessary,
vexatious and useless judicial reviews[.]” 208
While the ouster clause was withdrawn, judicial review has been effectively
curtailed by Parliament’s creation of the Upper Tribunal, the immigration
appellate tribunal (part of the Judiciary, but not the High Court), with the power

197. Joshua Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn on Asylum Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 16, 2004, at
2 [hereinafter Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn].
198. Clare Dyer, The Guardian Profile: Lord Woolf, GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, at 13.
199. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament has the final word on
legality. See McGarry, supra note 171, at 1–2. The courts exercise judicial review under the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty by reasoning that the courts are carrying out Parliament’s
intention against ultra vires actions. Id. at 5–6.
200. Andrew Le Sueur, Comment, Three Strikes and It’s Out? The UK Government’s Strategy
to Oust Judicial Review from Immigration and Asylum Decision-Making, 2004 PUB. L. 225, 233
(2004).
201. Richard Rawlings, Review, Revenge and Retreat, 68 MOD. L. REV. 378, 378 (2005).
202. Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn, supra note 197.
203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. See id.
205. Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is Coming True, supra note 193 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
206. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Rawlings, supra note 201, at 393.
208. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to act as the High Court when exercising judicial review. 209 So, even without
an ouster clause, immigration judicial review is undergoing a transition out of
the general courts and into the specialized immigration tribunal. For example,
many types of judicial reviews are heard in the Upper Tribunal, not in the
Administrative Court. 210 While not an elimination of judicial review per se, the
change of venue raises questions about whether judicial review will be of the
same quality in the Upper Tribunal. 211 The effort to transfer cases stems from
the perception that there were too many immigration judicial reviews clogging
up the Administrative Court. 212
In December 2012, the Ministry of Justice announced its intent to reform
judicial review generally, including immigration judicial review. 213 Among
other things, the reforms would tighten the availability of judicial review by
increasing fees. 214 While these reforms would affect more than just immigration
cases, the government mentioned that immigration cases were one of the
motivations for seeking reform. 215 The Minister of Justice’s Consultation Paper
announcing the proposed reforms acknowledged that the main area of growth in
applications for judicial review had been immigration and asylum matters,
comprising seventy-five percent of applications for judicial review. 216
As support for its proposal to limit judicial review, the government not only
cited the increase in total applications for judicial review across all subject
matter areas (160 in 1974 and over 11,000 in 2011), but also emphasized the
“small number of applications per year [that] proceed to a final hearing[.]” 217
The Consultation Paper stated that in 2011, only one in six applications for
permission to seek judicial review were granted. 218 The proposal was based on
the assumption that because so few applications are granted, the increase in
numbers of applications must be comprised of “weak or hopeless cases.” 219 That

209. R v. Upper Tribunal, [2011] UKSC 28.
210. See Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Direction Given in Accordance with Part 1 of
Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and Section 18 of the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY 1 (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Practice+Directions/Tribunals/
lcj-direction-jr-iac-21-08-2013.pdf.
See also Constitutional Law Grp., Robert Thomas:
Immigration Judicial Reviews, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Sept. 12, 2013, 11:40 AM),
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/09/12/robert-thomas-immigration-judicial-reviews/
[hereinafter Constitutional Law Grp., Immigration Judicial Reviews].
211. See Constitutional Law Grp., Immigration Judicial Reviews, supra note 210.
212. Id.
213. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM CP25-2012, at 4, 8–
9 (U.K.) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM].
214. Id. at 25–27.
215. Id. at 9–10.
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id. at 10.
218. Id. at 10.
219. Id. at 11.
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assumption influenced the government’s concern “that the Judicial Review
process may in some cases be subject to abuses, for example, used as a delaying
tactic, given the significant growth in its use but the small proportion of cases
that stand any reasonable prospect of success.” 220 Again citing the limited
success rate of cases seeking judicial review, the government stated, “Whilst
Judicial Review plays a vital role in upholding the rule of law and holding the
Executive to account, we do not believe it should be allowed to be used as a
tactical device simply to delay decisions and the consequences flowing from
them.” 221
In the Impact Assessment accompanying the Consultation Paper, the
Government commented, “Businesses/individuals may lose out from cases
being finalised [sic] more quickly if they would benefit indirectly from delays
in the [judicial review] process.” 222 However, the Impact Assessment uncovered
little data supporting the proposal and revealed that the proposal addressed areas
where either data was unavailable or that the proposal was based on
assumptions. 223
Concern about using judicial review as a delay tactic to gain some sort of
advantage permeates the proposal. 224 The U.K. Immigration Law Practitioners’
Association (ILPA) rejected the proposal’s delay justification, explaining other
forces at work behind increased attempts to access judicial review. 225 These
other forces included attempts to redress poor decision-making by the Home
Office. 226 Others objected to the delay justification because the proposal
reached that justification on a “very dubious basis,” emphasizing the major
limitations of the government’s data. 227 For example, in calculating a low
success rate for those seeking judicial review, and thus leading the government
to infer that there were too many meritless claims, one analysis concluded that
the government excluded cases that dropped out of the system soon after

220. Id. at 4.
221. Id. at 20.
222. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW: ENGAGEMENT EXERCISE 2012, at 3 (U.K.).
223. See id. at 1–22.
224. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, supra note 213, at 4 (noting
that “the [g]overnment [was] concerned that the Judicial Review process may in some cases be
subject to abuses”).
225. Immigration Law Practitioners’ Ass’n, ILPA’s Response to the Ministry of Justice
Consultation: Judicial Review – Proposals for Further Reform, ILPA 1 (2013),
http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/21180/13.11.01-ILPA-response-to-Ministry-of-Justiceconsultation-Judicial-Review-Proposals-for-Further-Reform.pdf.
226. See id. at 20–28.
227. Constitutional Law Grp., Varda Bondy and Maurice Sunkin: Judicial Review Reform:
Who is Afraid of Judicial Review? Debunking the Myths of Growth and Abuse, UK CONST. L.
ASS’N (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:23 PM), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/01/10/varda-bondy-andmaurice-sunkin-judicial-review-reform-who-is-afraid-of-judicial-review-debunking-the-mythsof-growth-and-abuse/.
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filing. 228 Another study found that “over a third of claims are likely to be settled
[early on], usually in the claimant’s favour [sic].” 229 Without including these
settlements as “successes,” the government artificially depressed the number of
cases with a successful outcome. 230
Finally, while not solely targeted at judicial review, a related effort to severely
restrict the role of judges generally in immigration cases further illustrates the
anti-process tenor of the discussion surrounding immigration adjudication in the
U.K. 231 As described above, under Article 8 of the ECHR, there is a right to
respect for private and family life, and this right is enforceable in U.K. courts. 232
This right is qualified, meaning that the government may interfere with the right
under certain circumstances. 233 A right to private and family life may be
curtailed if it is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. 234
Therefore, the question of whether Article 8 protections may be curtailed
becomes one of balancing facts and applying those facts to existing law: a classic
adjudicatory exercise.
This Article 8 right implicates immigration cases because, for example, a
foreign national in deportation proceedings may argue that deportation, and the
accompanying consequence of separation from family with permission to
remain in the U.K., would violate the foreign national’s Article 8 rights. 235 In
such a case, the judge deciding whether to order deportation would consider
whether the government’s desired deportation would unlawfully interfere with
the foreign national’s Article 8 rights, or whether deportation is justified under
existing standards. 236
The Home Office has been acting to diminish judges’ roles in balancing
Article 8 rights. 237 Through primary legislation, the Home Office has pushed

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Constitutional Law Grp., Robert Thomas: The New Immigration Rules and the Right to
Family Life, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/
2012/10/04/robert-thomas-the-new-immigration-rules-and-the-right-to-family-life/
[hereinafter
Constitutional Law Grp., The New Immigration Rules].
232. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
233. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
234. Id.
235. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
236. See Constitutional Law Grp., The New Immigration Rules, supra note 231.
237. Id.
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for changes in the law to dictate how adjudicators determine when there is an
improper interference with Article 8 rights. 238 As one commentator described,
“The Home Secretary’s view on Article 8, and where the balance lies, will be
forced on judges.” 239 This ongoing controversy raises serious constitutional
questions about the balance of powers in the U.K., and whether the U.K. is
complying with its obligations under European law. 240
Similar to events in the United States, court access in immigration cases has
been a consistent target in the U.K. Immigration adjudication occupies a similar
uncomfortable position in the U.K.: it exists, but it is restricted and is the subject
of efforts to restrict access further. One major difference is that the U.K.
Parliament, through primary legislation, has set a default position that individual
interests are on a more level playing field in immigration law. Yet, efforts to
curtail immigrant access to courts continue under the banner of delay.
2. A Lesson for the United States
While the function of and challenges facing immigration adjudication in the
United States and the U.K. are not identical, they are characterized by a similar
tension. Both nations have elaborate systems by which to adjudicate removal
cases, but those systems are each subject to current restrictions and the near
constant threat of further restrictions. In both nations, delay, including blame on
individual foreign nationals and their attorneys for seeking review, is often
mentioned as a justification for curtailing access to justice.
The existence of a similar phenomenon in the U.K. is a discouraging sign; it
suggests that formally adopting a more modern approach to immigration
sovereignty is not a guaranteed protection against efforts to narrow court access
in immigration cases. It further suggests that underlying conflicts remain, even
in a nation that has permitted enforcement of the ECHR in its domestic courts.
What would motivate a government to push its nation to the brink of a
constitutional crisis, as was accomplished by the proposed ouster clause in the
U.K.? Surely not just a concern, based solely on anecdotal evidence, that foreign
nationals may seek court review to delay action in an immigration case. There
are less nuclear options available to screen for frivolous cases, including a study
to confirm whether there really is a problem at all. There must be something
more fundamental at stake, and we must peel back the layers to uncover the true
nature of the argument.
238. Immigration Act 2014, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2014/22/section/19/enacted (last visited Dec. 22, 2014); Immigration Bill Becomes Law, supra note
188.
239. Adam Wagner, We Shouldn’t Let the Home Secretary Load the Dice over Human Rights,
NEW STATESMAN, May 8, 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/05/we-shouldnt-lethome-secretary-load-dice-over-human-rights.
240. Mark Elliott, The Queen’s Speech, the Immigration Bill and Article 8 ECHR, PUB. L. FOR
EVERYONE (May 9, 2013), http://publiclawforeveryone.com/2013/05/09/the-queens-speech-theimmigration-bill-and-article-8-echr/.

130

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:99

Analyzing the underlying issues in the United States reveals a debate about
immigration sovereignty; conflicting notions of the role of individual rights in
immigration law are at the core of the debate over the scope of judicial review
in immigration removal cases. The U.S. Supreme Court could update its
explanation of sovereignty in immigration cases. What are now considered
exceptions to the plenary power doctrine could become the norm. The Supreme
Court could clarify to admirers of the purest form of plenary power that such
power is not recognized under U.S. law. Modern notions of sovereignty do not
require the grant of raw, unrestricted power to the government to do what it likes
with respect to immigration law. The Court has already chipped away at the
plenary power notion of sovereignty through its decisions in cases that scrutinize
detention practices and that insist on procedural protections during the removal
hearing process. 241 The Court could abandon the plenary power doctrine and
reframe the legal discourse. However, the U.K. experience suggests that such a
formal legal shift is not enough. Because U.S. immigration law has been steeped
in classical notions of immigration sovereignty for so long, a cultural shift is also
required. 242
III. CONCLUSION
Immigration adjudication occupies an uncomfortable space in the realm of
U.S. law. A system to review a removal decision exists, but it is subject to major
restrictions and lives under threat of further restrictions. Since 1961, there have
been consistent efforts in the United States to restrict judicial review of
immigration removal decisions. Proponents frequently justify the need to
restrict judicial review with the claim that foreign nationals seek access to the
courts as a means to delay removal. This narrative implies that foreign nationals
engage in questionable behavior when seeking review of a decision to remove
the individual from the United States.
This Article finds the claims about delay to disguise a fundamental
disagreement about immigration sovereignty. The delay rationale lacks depth
and support. Instead, arguments to limit judicial review coincide with support
for a nineteenth century, pure plenary power notion of immigration sovereignty
that prescribes elevating the will of the nation above all else. A disagreement
about the proper meaning of immigration sovereignty is at the root of the
uncomfortable position of immigration adjudication in the United States. The
debate is about the place of individual rights in immigration law, and the debate
should proceed on those terms.
It would be a significant advancement if the U.S. Supreme Court were to
abandon completely the plenary power notion of sovereignty in immigration
241. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
242. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 49, 92 (2013) (arguing that immigration reformers in the U.S. should engage and
shape the democratic will of citizens).
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law. But it is doubtful that such a decision would move immigration
adjudication from its uncomfortable tension. While the U.K. has formally
integrated a more modern notion of sovereignty into its domestic law, efforts to
restrict review of removal decisions continue. This experience suggests that a
more fundamental cultural shift is needed. Formal legal change is an important
step, but on its own, it is not a guarantee that immigration adjudication will find
peace.
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